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INTRODUCTION 
Since the promulgation of the modern Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) in 
1978, the nation’s insolvency laws have been a virtual paragon of the orderly 
administration of debtors’ estates and a model of equality of distribution to needy 
creditors.  The latter can largely be credited to a cogent and concise statutory scheme 
that precisely ordinates creditors and provides for the payment of their claims in that 
same strict order.  Or at least, that is what it is supposed to do. 
 The simple truth is that sometimes it does not.  In recent years, certain 
bankruptcy courts have unilaterally discarded the clear statutory directives found in 
the Code.  Instead, by dredging up arcane notions from a bygone era in the name of 
equity and expediency, they have circumvented the statutory priorities, paying certain 
favored creditors prematurely, often to the detriment of the general creditor body. 
 The justification for this disregard of statutory priorities was once known as 
the “Doctrine of Necessity”; in recent days, however, it has evolved into the more 
sinister guise of so-called “critical vendor” motions.  Critical vendor motions arise 
when a debtor seeks court authority to pay a select group of pre-petition creditors, in 
full or in part, based on their pre-bankruptcy claims, long before the great mass of 
general creditors sees a penny.  Debtors and the “vendor elite” justify such 
extraordinary measures by claiming that these creditors are vital to the post-
bankruptcy operations of the debtor, and that such vendors will refuse to supply 
goods or services until they are made whole by the payment of old debts.  Thus, the 
debtors plead that it is imperative to pay these pre-petition claims to assure post-
petition business, regardless of the unfairness to all other not-so-elite creditors, to say 
nothing of the blatant disregard for statutory authority.  Is this a form of economic 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, The Peter J. Tobin College of Business, St. John’s University, New 
York, and partner, Sabino & Sabino, P.C., New York.  The author dedicates this Article to the 
Honorable E. Donald Shapiro, Dean Emeritus and The Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor of 
Law, New York Law School, with profound thanks for his years of encouragement, support, and, 
most of all, true friendship, which made this Article and a great many other things possible. 
48 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [VOL. 6 
blackmail?  Quite possibly so, but bankruptcy courts now succumb to it almost 
routinely, threatening to make it the norm, not the exception. 
 However, a notable core of courts has stepped forward to champion 
adherence to the statutory priorities of the Bankruptcy Code.  Under the law’s 
banner, they have refused to give in to the demands of critical vendors.  Recently, a 
landmark ruling has emerged from one of the circuit courts of appeals, calling for a 
strict limitation of these so called “critical vendor” motions; in essence, advocating 
their prohibition except for the most dire circumstances. 
 The controversy surrounding critical vendor motions first implicates an issue 
vital to the recognition and preservation of sound and well-reasoned bankruptcy 
practice in today’s complex cases.  Second, it represents an opportunity to debunk 
tired old concepts that have been rendered irrelevant by the modern Code.  But most 
of all, this controversy highlights the dangers inherent in ignoring clear statutory 
authority, or stretching the plain meaning of statutes beyond recognition.  
Conversely, the correct outcome of the instant controversy stands as a model for 
principled statutory construction and a sensible adherence to the plain meaning of 
statutes. 
THE “DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY” AND “CRITICAL VENDOR” MOTIONS 
 Every controversy has a starting point.  We find that the beginnings of the 
instant dispute stretch back nearly a century and a half.  It all started with dogma, 
supposedly based upon dire necessity, but the intervening decades—particularly at 
the end of the Twentieth Century—turned it into an overworked and abused 
doctrine. 
 It is an axiom of bankruptcy law that pre-petition claims be paid at the end of 
a case, either as a liquidated distribution or pursuant to the terms of a plan of 
reorganization.1  However, even limited rues have their exceptions.  The “Doctrine 
of Necessity” is such an exception in Chapter 11 cases. 
 The “Doctrine of Necessity” permits early payouts to otherwise ordinary 
creditors if the circumstances are compelling.  A typical example is for a pre-petition 
creditor, whose services are vital to the post-petition efforts to reorganize, to 
demand to be paid now rather than later.  Because the Chapter 11 proceeding would 
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be jeopardized if the creditor refused to do business post-petition, the pre-petition 
creditor may be paid much earlier than usual upon such a showing of “necessity.”2 
 The modern “Doctrine of Necessity” had a humble beginning.  It began as 
the “Necessity of Payment” rule, developed especially for use in railroad 
reorganizations.  It was justified by the perceived need for the advance payment of 
pre-petition debts “paid under duress to secure continued supplies or services 
essential to the continued operation of the railroad.”3  In its second iteration, the 
“Necessity of Payment” rule came to be known as the “Doctrine of Necessity” and 
was applied broadly for the first time to all types of reorganizations, not just 
railroads.  In modern times, its use has been justified for the pre-reorganization 
payment of the pre-petition claims of creditors who threaten to withhold goods or 
services believed critical to the Chapter 11 reorganization efforts.4  Hence, in its third 
iteration, the concept became known as the “critical vendor” motion. 
 “Critical vendor” motions are generally grouped under the heading of “first 
day orders” or “first day motions.”  The Bankruptcy Code prohibits debtors from 
taking certain actions, especially paying pre-bankruptcy claims, once a bankruptcy 
case is commenced.  The attendant disruptions to business, particularly for a 
reorganizing debtor, can be detrimental to the going concern value of the Chapter 11 
estate.  Therefore, “it is common to ask for certain ‘first day’ relief from the 
Bankruptcy Court to allow for a smooth transition into bankruptcy,” including the 
maintenance of preexisting vendor relationships.5 
 The “critical vendor” motion comes into play where trade creditors “hold 
some type of advantage over the [debtor] or could otherwise create difficulties with 
the [debtor’s] reorganizational efforts.”6  For example, a critical vendor may supply 
an essential or customized product or may be the sole source of a product, or it may 
be impractical for the debtor to find a reasonably priced replacement vendor.  The 
loss of such an irreplaceable vendor would be disadvantageous, if not crippling, to 
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the reorganization effort.7  Yet the “critical vendor” motions of today are merely the 
flowers of seeds planted long ago.  Thus, to fully comprehend the practices of the 
present, we must examine their antecedents. 
The Railroad Cases – A Voice from the Past 
 The Supreme Court discussed the most direct ancestor of the modern critical 
vendor rule in 1878, a full century before the Bankruptcy Code became the law of 
the land, and two complete decades prior to the promulgation of the former 
Bankruptcy Act. 
 That case, Fosdick v. Schall,8 centered on a railroad reorganization.  History 
tells that this case established a “six month” rule giving priority to pre-petition 
unsecured creditors over and before secured claims.  But it is the language of this 
venerable opinion that is so prescient.  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Waite 
stated, “we have no doubt” that a court of equity may direct “payments from the 
income” during the insolvency case to “outstanding debts for labor, supplies, 
equipment . . . as may, under the circumstances of the particular case, appear to be 
reasonable.”9  The comparative newness of railroad mortgage financing and its highly 
individualistic nature gave the Court pause.  “Peculiar” in character and “affect[ing] 
peculiar interests,” such mortgages involve large amounts, “and the rights of the 
parties oftentimes [are] complicated and conflicting.”10  This was an interesting 
observation from the Supreme Court one hundred years before the advent of the 
modern Bankruptcy Code.  But more was to come. 
 Significantly, the Chief Justice declared that it is rare for railroad 
reorganizations to proceed “without some concession by some parties from their 
strict legal rights, in order to secure advantages that could not otherwise be attained, 
and which it is supposed will operate for the general good of all who are interested.  
This results almost as a matter of necessity . . . .”11  Viewed in the light of today’s 
bankruptcy jurisprudence, this is a magnificent rendering of the penultimate rationale 
of bending the nominal rights of superior creditors in order to obtain a greater good.  
                                                 
7 Id. at 69.  See also Daniel A. Lowenthal, III & Peter V. Marchetti, Critical Vendor Motions, 20 THE 
BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (June 10, 2003) (“[U]nless such motions are granted, vendors will cease 
supplying them and thus jeopardize their ability to reorganize.”). 
8  99 U.S. 235 (1878). 
9  Id. at 251-52. 
10 Id. at 252. 
11 Id. (emphasis added). 
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But the Supreme Court could not have anticipated the consequences of its use of the 
word “necessity.” 
 The Court continued with the common sense observation that railroads are 
creatures of credit.  Moreover, the temporal span of such borrowing, whether long 
or short term, is dictated by necessity.  This creates a situation where normally short 
term obligations for current usage of labor, supplies, and equipment are left to 
accumulate in order to forestall the exercise of the secured creditors’ lawful powers 
to foreclose or otherwise shut down the insolvent railroad by seizing pledged assets.  
In short, “daily and monthly earnings, which ordinarily should go to pay the daily 
and monthly expenses” are diverted from “those to whom in equity they belong, and 
used to pay the mortgage debt.”12 
 In those times, secured creditors of railroads accepted collateral and 
“impliedly agreed” that current debt from continuing operations would “be paid 
from the current receipts before [the creditor] has any claim upon the income.  If for 
the convenience of the moment something is taken” from what stands as the current 
debt and paid to secured creditors, “it certainly is not equitable for the court” to 
impose a requirement that funds be restored by paying current expenses before 
secured creditors may realize upon their collateral.13  Thus, “a court will only do what  
. . . the company ought itself to do.”14  To be sure, this was an equitable approach, 
and the Court was mindful to take steps solely “to restore the parties to their original 
equitable rights.”15  Indeed, because this was a notion grounded in equity, the Court 
refused to impose any “fixed and inflexible rule.”16 
 Yet what is truly amazing about Frosdick is that while it is often cited as 
establishing the “six month” rule, in truth it does no such thing.  The actual text of 
the opinion delivered by Chief Judge Waite makes but a single, isolated mention of 
the fact that the state court receiver had been authorized by a state judge to make 
payment to creditors out of funds derived from secured collateral “for six months 
before” the receiver was appointed.17  At the conclusion of the Justices’ decision, the 
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circuit court’s decision was reversed only insofar as to the payment of certain sums, 
but was affirmed in all other respects.18 
 The inescapable fact is that the Supreme Court never emotes a “six month” 
rule under that name or any other.  Notwithstanding their detailed discussion of 
collateral, secured creditors, and what we today call post-petition administrative 
claims, the Justices never, directly or indirectly, declares a so-called “six month” rule.  
Were it not for the barest of mentions in the factual description of the lower court 
proceedings, there would be absolutely no basis to associate Fosdick with a purported 
“six month” rule.19 
 Another Nineteenth Century railroad case often cited in support of the 
“Doctrine of Necessity” is Miltenberger v. Logansport Railway Co.,20 decided a few years 
after Fosdick.  Compared to its predecessor, Miltenberger comes a few steps closer to 
actually articulating the Doctrine, but does not quite succeed.  On the facts, Justice 
Blatchford first notes that the lower federal court appointed a receiver for the failed 
railroad, and “empower[ed] him to operate and manage said road, receive its 
revenues, pay its operating expenses . . . and to pay the arrears due for operating 
expenses for a period in the past not exceeding ninety days.”21 
 This fact made its presence keenly felt in the legal discussion when the 
Justices addressed the allowance of expenses incurred more than ninety days before 
the receiver was appointed.22  Notably, the receiver’s petition alleged “that payment 
of that class of claims was indispensable to the business of the road, and that, unless 
the receiver was authorized to provide for them at once, the business of the road 
                                                 
18 Id. at 255-56. 
19 As was the style of the reporting of Supreme Court opinions in the nineteenth century, a detailed 
discussion of the underlying facts was followed by the presentation of each side’s arguments—only 
then did the Court’s opinion follow.  Within the statement of facts, there is only one mention of “six 
months” or its like.  The Federal Circuit Court below held that the clerk of the court, as the 
stakeholder of funds generated during the stat court receivership, could pay rent for the subject coal 
cars “at the rate of seven dollars per moth for the six months preceding” the date of the appointment of 
the state court receiver.  Id. at 240 (emphasis added).  Significantly, neither side’s argument ever utters 
the words “six months” or anything remotely similar to them.  Id. at 241-49.  While the syllabus is 
irrelevant and holds not an ounce of weight of authority, United States v. Detroit Timber and Lumber Co., 
200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906), is utterly silent as to the alleged “six month” rule or anything akin to such a 
proposition. 
20 106 U.S. 286 (1882). 
21 Id. at 292. 
22 Id. at 311. 
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would suffer great detriment.”23  To be sure, the court below deemed that 
explanation satisfactory.24 
 Intriguingly, Justice Blatchford further relates that the special master who 
was appointed later to review the receiver’s accounting “disallowed several items in 
the receiver’s accounts, . . . where the claims were made on the ground that the 
creditors threatened not to furnish any more supplies on credit unless they were paid 
the arrears.”25  The master’s action, as approved by the judge below and implicitly 
approved here, “appears to have been careful, discriminating, and judicious.”26  But 
the legal justification validating the master’s move was far more significant. 
 The Supreme Court opined: 
Many circumstances may exist which may make it necessary and 
indispensable to the business of the road and the preservation of the 
property, for the receiver to pay preexisting debts of certain classes, 
out of the earnings of the receivership, or even the corpus of the 
property, under the order of the court, with a priority of lien.  Yet the 
discretion to do so should be exercised with very great care.  The 
payment of such debts stands, prima facie, on a different basis from 
the payment of claims arising under the receivership, while it may be 
brought within the principle of the latter by special circumstances.27 
 It is apparent that operating expenses arising out of “indispensable business 
relations, where a stoppage of the continuance of such business relations would be a 
probable result, in case of non-payment” may be paid in limited amounts.28  Such 
payments have the efficacy of preserving the mortgaged property and maintaining 
the good will and value of the enterprise as an integrated, operating whole.29  Yet let 
there be no mistake, the Supreme Court encapsulated this holding with one vital 
caveat:  the foregoing perspective was firmly grounded upon the public interest in a 
railroad as public convenience whose smooth functioning made for special 
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considerations.30  Given the above, the failure of the objecting parties to specify what 
sums paid they believed to be improper, along with all the other circumstances 
implicitly unique to railroads and the public interest therein, led the Supreme Court 
to uphold the lower court’s allowance of the payments.31 
 There we have the two Supreme Court landmarks that purportedly justify the 
“Doctrine of Necessity” and its progeny of today, the critical vendor motion.  It is 
indeed astounding that certain key words such as “necessity” crop up in the 
supposed context of a six-month time frame.  But is this enough?  Are these few, 
vague references, made in unique circumstances that became irrelevant long ago, still 
a foundation for the critical vendor relief granted today? 
The Doctrine of Necessity – A Troubled Dogma 
 Despite the undeniably controversial aspects of the “Doctrine of Necessity,” 
some courts found reliance upon it to be unavoidable.  From time to time, the 
doctrine came into play with regard to employee claims.  In In re Eqalnet 
Communications Corp.,32 the debtor pleaded necessity to pay the pre-petition claim of 
an essential contract employee well before plan confirmation.  The bankruptcy court 
declared its unwillingness to substitute its judgment for the business judgment of the 
debtor.  It was inclined to accept on good fait the movant’s cry of necessity.33  
Moreover, some of the proposed payment in this case was entitled to priority as a 
statutory wage claim.  Given the preexisting priority, the bankruptcy judge declared 
that common sense dictated that the payment be permitted since it would assist in 
the debtor’s reorganization.34  Therefore, the early payment of the pre-petition wage 
claim was allowed, though it was limited to the sum entitled to under Section 
507(a)(3) wage priority.35   
                                                 
30 Id. (citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 135 (1881)). 
31 Id.  See also id. at 293 (The receiver had pleaded to the lower court that part of a ten thousand dollar 
debt due to connecting railroad lines was incurred more than 90 days before his appointment, “but 
the payment of that class of claims was indispensable to the business of the road, and it would suffer 
great detriment unless he was authorized to proved for them at once.”). 
32 258 B.R. 368 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001). 
33 Id. at 370. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
2004]         CRITICAL VENDOR MOTIONS AND THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY 55 
Not every court has embraced the troublesome doctrine.  The “Doctrine of 
Necessity” came under scathing criticism in In re Chandlier.36  In that unusual case, an 
attorney who had been found not authorized to practice law in the jurisdiction 
attempted to collect pre-petition legal fees relating to his alleged representation of a 
Chapter 7 debtor.37  The U.S. Trustee sought disgorgement at the fees and 
sanctions.38  The putative attorney claimed entitlement to his fee on the basis of the 
“Doctrine of Necessity.” 
 On that argument, Bankruptcy Judge Jo Ann C. Stevenson held nothing 
back, declaring, “[t]he Doctrine itself is a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 507 and in fact, is 
not authorized by any Bankruptcy Code section.”39  When it has been employed, it is 
in Chapter 11 cases “under very extraordinary circumstances of a few critical vendors 
who furnish the debtor with unique and vital supplies so that the debtor can operate 
and reorganize.”40  Thus, the court refused to apply the “Doctrine of Necessity.”  
This was a liquidation case, not reorganization; the purported attorney was neither a 
vendor nor a supplier; and the debtor had no further need of the attorney’s services, 
given that other counsel could fill any future need.41  The putative attorney did not 
collect a fee on the basis of the doctrine or any other basis.42 
 In many respects, the “Doctrine of Necessity” was an unwanted and 
undesired intruder into the absolute priority of creditor claims.  It is rarely a good 
thing for mere doctrine to overcome statutory text; yet some courts have seen the 
“Doctrine of Necessity” as a sometimes-necessary evil.  It was therefore left to 
bankruptcy courts to employ it sparingly, if at all, so as to not upset the delicate 
balance struck by Congress in the Code.  Otherwise, use of this questionable 
doctrine would be inequitable and would usurp the carefully balanced priorities 
already established. 
                                                 
36 292 B.R. 583 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2003). 
37 Id. at 583. 
38 Id. at 585-86. 
39 Id. at 586. 
40 Id. at 588. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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“Critical Vendor” Motions Today 
 Notwithstanding the cautionary note above, the “Doctrine of Necessity” 
took on a new life and is now seen all too frequently in so-called “critical vendor” 
motions.  The reorganizing debtor seeks permission to pay the pre-petition, non-
priority, unsecured claims of certain vendors.  The debtor alleges it must satisfy those 
claims in order to keep doing vital post-petition business with those vendors.  These 
extraordinary motions encountered increased skepticism from the courts, as did the 
“Doctrine of Necessity” itself.  Many courts sought to limit application of the 
Doctrine to truly extreme circumstances.43  Not surprisingly, many jurisdictions 
frowned upon the practice.44 
 A linchpin of the instant controversy is the appropriate use of Section 105 of 
the modern Bankruptcy Code.  In relevant part, the statute provides that the court 
“may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry 
out the provisions of this title.”45  As one might imagine, a liberal interpretation of 
Section 105 would empower a bankruptcy court to do many things under the banner 
of “necessary and appropriate,” including granting “critical vendor” motions.  
Conversely, a more conservative point of view would limit the use of the statute to 
achieve the ends of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 The quintessential case for judicial restraint in employing Section 105 to pay 
creditors out of turn is the Fifth Circuit landmark of Chiasson v. Matherne (In re Oxford 
Management, Inc.).46  There, the nub of the dispute was the payment of a real estate 
broker’s commissions out of the property of a debtor, which was itself a defunct real 
estate broker.47  The bankruptcy court exercised its equitable power under Section 
105 to compel the debtor to pay the claimant before any general distribution.  An 
appeal followed.48 
 Pertinent to this article is the Fifth Circuit’s finding of the limitations 
inherent in Section 105.  The court recognized that the statute expressly “authorizes 
a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the substantive 
                                                 
43 In re Coserve L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 496-98 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
44 See, e.g., In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc., 4 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1993). 
45 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2004). 
46 4 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1993). 
47 Id. at 1332-33. 
48 Id. at 1333. 
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provisions” of Title 11.49  “But, the powers granted by [Section 105] must be 
exercised in a manner that is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.”50  The statute 
does not authorize the creation of substantive rights not firmly rooted in law.  
Bankruptcy judges cannot create rights or remedies by judicial fiat or hold a “roving 
commission” to do equity.51 
 Applying that principle of limitation to the case before it, the tribunal further 
noted that pre-Code law did not grant bankruptcy courts authority to allow payment 
out of estate property except as strictly provided for by statute.52  As for the modern 
Code, it lacks any statute that “would allow the payment of post-petition funds to 
satisfy pre-petition claims.”53  The court held that it was wrong for the lower court to 
elevate the status of these particular creditors above other general unsecured 
claimants.54  Such a deviation from the scheme of equality of distribution called for 
by the Code “effectuated an impermissible substantive alteration of the Code’s 
provisions.”55  It was thus clear error for the bankruptcy court to exceed its equitable 
powers as found in Section 105; thus, the order was reversed.56 
 It comes as no surprise that Oxford has long been a landmark for curtailing 
the use of Section 105 and limiting its application to situations such a critical vendor 
relief.  Thus, we often find Oxford cited by jurists opposed to such motions.  But the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision has not been universally accepted.  Certain courts have 
voiced disagreement by relying upon Section 105, among other statutes, in approving 
“critical vendor” motions. 
 Given the disagreement, we shall begin this part of our discussion by 
examining those courts that have taken a broader view of their powers under Section 
105-those courts that have concluded that they can usurp statutory priorities and 
grant critical vendor relief. 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1334. 
51 Id. (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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“All Those in Favor of “Critical Vendor” Motions . . .” 
 One of the most oft cited cases used to justify the granting of “critical 
vendor” motions is In re Just for Feet, Inc.,57 which arose from the travails of the 
popular sneaker and athletic apparel chain in the late 1990s.  The debtor started its 
corporate life in 1973 as a chain of superstores specializing in name brand footwear 
and related apparel.58  Outsized floor space, in-store entertainment, and even 
basketball courts for “test runs” of the merchandise characterized Just for Feet retail 
outlets.  Most pertinent to this analysis, Just for Feet made its mark by carrying 
anywhere from 2,500 to 4,500 different styles of sneakers and foot gear, an 
astronomical leap beyond the typical mall-based rivals that typically carried a few 
hundred styles at best.59 
 Despite its unique approach to athletic footwear retailing, Just for Feet 
encountered liquidity difficulties in mid-1999.  Unable to stanch its decline, the chain 
filed for Chapter 11 in November of that same year.60  Days after filing its petition, 
the debtor made a critical vendor motion.61  In testimony, the retailer’s CEO argued 
that the surviving stores required a continuous flow of new footwear and apparel 
from a few key suppliers.62  The debtor’s chief executive emphasized that the 
debtor’s business was not just selling sneakers; rather, it was in the business of selling 
athletic gear as fashion.  Given the dynamic and fickle nature of the industry, the 
debtor “‘need[s] new styles, new colors, hot products on the floor to get the 
customer in the door.’”63 
 Just for Feet’s suppliers were the dominant vendors of cutting edge 
merchandise and the list was a virtual “who’s who” of the athletic footwear elite:  
Nike, New Balance, Fila, Reebok, Adidas, Asics, K-Swiss, and Converse.64  Those 
sellers knew well the essential role they played in the debtor’s business, for just after 
the retailer filed for Chapter 11, most, if not all, of them demanded immediate 
                                                 
57 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999). 
58 Id. at 822. 
59 Id. at 822-23 
60 Id. at 822. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 823. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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payment of their pre-petition claims in exchange for post-petition shipments.65  In 
effect, the major sneaker makers held new merchandise hostage until Just for Feet 
paid old debts.  The top vendor’s pre-petition claims were not insignificant.  They 
totaled approximately $33 million in gross and comprised almost half of the debtor’s 
trade vendor arrearages.66 
 According to Just for Feet’s chief executive, this put the debtor in a horrid 
situation.  The debtor supposedly needed $50 million in fresh inventory before 
Thanksgiving (less than three weeks away), but this far had only obtained half that 
amount in post-petition financing.67  The debtor portrayed the situation as a fight for 
survival for the debtor, for without court approval of critical vendor payments, the 
retailer’s reorganization might be doomed to failure.68 
 While there is no doubt that Just for Feet was in dire straits, various creditors 
and the U.S. Trustee objected to the proposal to pay the pre-petition claims of the 
footwear vendors.69  The objectors first argued that the court had no power under 
the Bankruptcy Code to authorize such out of turn payments.70  Second, the 
opposition criticized the debtor’s proposal as lacking in sufficient detail to merit 
court approval.71 
 Thus, the dispute came before Delaware District Judge McKelvie.72  The 
court first examined Section 105, the broad statutory grant of the Bankruptcy Code 
that empowers courts presiding over bankruptcy cases to issue any order necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of Title 11.73  The court noted that this 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 823-24. 
69 Id. at 824. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 To be sure, federal district judges normally hear only appeals of bankruptcy judge orders.  However, 
as the District of Delaware became the favored court for filing complicated Chapter 11 
“megabankruptcies,” it was decided that the small and already overburdened Delaware Bankruptcy 
Court would share bankruptcy case allocation with its superiors on the district bench.  Since 
bankruptcy jurisdiction vests with the Article III district court and is “referred down” to the Article I 
bankruptcy court, 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), et seq., this was both simple and constitutionally correct. 
73 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 824.  See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2004). 
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statute has been employed in modern times as a justification for the exercise of an 
equitable power to authorize the early payment of pre-petition claims, and deemed to 
be a natural extension of the uncodified “Doctrine of Necessity” found in pre-Code 
days.74  The Delaware court cited decisions of its home appellate court, the Third 
Circuit, to exemplify this history.75  Notably, it cited its home tribunal’s precedents in 
railroad reorganizations. 
 The Just for Feet court also acknowledged decisions cited by the opposition 
which forbade the immediate payment of pre-petition claims.76  Judge McKelvie was 
also cognizant of recent Supreme Court cases that forbid derogation of the 
Bankruptcy Code’s statutory scheme of priority of payment.77  Nonetheless, the 
district court found those cases inapposite.  As for the Supreme Court precedents, 
Judge McKelvie contended that they merely prevented the subordination of IRS tax 
claims under a different Bankruptcy Code section.78  “The Supreme Court cases . . . 
do not hold that a bankruptcy court may never use its equitable powers to authorize 
payment to vendors when such payment is critical to the reorganization.”79  
Continuing, the court relied upon the “Doctrine of Necessity” for authority to pay 
critical vendors pre-bankruptcy claims.80  Thus, in dual reliance upon the pre-Code 
“Doctrine of Necessity” and the modern law’s Section 105, District Judge McKelvie 
found himself empowered to authorize the payment of critical vendors.81   
Nonetheless, the court still had to address the objectors’ claims that the 
debtor’s proposal was too poorly defined.  Here, Just for Feet recognized that it is the 
movant’s burden to demonstrate the unavoidable need for early payment.82  Again, 
Judge McKelvie held that the debtor had a better argument.  “Clearly, Just for Feet 
                                                 
74 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 824-25. 
75 Id. (citing In re Lehigh & New England Railway Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3rd Cir. 1981); In re Penn 
Central Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 102 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1972)). 
76 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 825.  See In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc. 4 F.3d at 1333-34; In re FCX, 
Inc., 60 B.R. 405, 410 (E.D.N.C. 1986). 
77 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 825.   
78 Id. (discussing United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996); 
United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996)). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 825-26. 
81 Id. at 826. 
82 Id. 
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cannot survive unless it has name brand sneakers and athletic apparel to sell in its 
stores.”83  A steady supply of new goods from the aforementioned top-drawer 
suppliers was absolutely necessary if the debtor had any hope of surviving.84  Thus, 
given the essential status of those highly recognizable vendors, the court concluded 
that paying them was appropriate.85 
 Various bankruptcy courts have approached “critical vendor” motions 
differently.  Chief Bankruptcy Judge Arthur Federman of Missouri’s Western District 
confronted a somewhat unique situation in In re Payless Cashways, Inc.,86 and rendered 
an intelligent but specialized decision that has not found broad application. 
 The debtor Payless operated over one hundred stores, selling lumber and 
building materials to contractors and homeowners.87  The instant case was its second 
Chapter 11 case, so it proceeded from shaky ground.88  Lumber was one of its key 
sales items; for without it, customers would go elsewhere to buy wood and all other 
related items that comprised the bulk of Payless’ sales.89  Simply put, no lumber 
meant no business. 
 Thus, the debtor filed an emergency “first day” motion, seeking by various 
means to ensure a steady post-bankruptcy supply of this essential lumber.90  Part of 
the enticement for critical lumber vendors was the post-petition payment of all or 
some of their pre-petition claims.91  The debtor’s CEO testified as to the absolute 
necessity to have lumber in stock, the ability of the lumber vendors to ignore Payless 
and sell to solvent competitors, the debtor’s near lack of lumber products in its 
depleted inventory during the peak season, and Payless’ significant difficulties in 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 268 B.R. 543 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001). 
87 Id. at 544. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 545. 
90 Id. at 544-45. 
91 Id. at 545. 
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obtaining credit on customary terms because this proceeding was its second Chapter 
11 case.92 
 The CEO’s testimony that the debtor did not have post-petition financing, 
but was instead seeking court authority to use cash collateral was important.  
Accordingly, the court treated the prayer for relief before it as a borrowing request 
under Section 364.93  Notably, this treatment implied that there was no actual motion 
to borrow money pursuant to Section 364.94 
 The debtor’s request was only opposed by the U.S. Trustee, who argued that 
the Bankruptcy Code did not empower a court to authorize a debtor to pay pre-
petition debts prior to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.95  Indeed, the 
committee of unsecured creditors approved the proposal to pay the pre-petition 
debts that Payless owed to the lumber vendors.96 
 Chief Judge Federman first acknowledged the nominal correctness of the 
U.S. Trustee’s reliance upon the absolute priority rule for the payment of claims in 
bankruptcy cases.97  Nonetheless, “courts [have] recognized that in certain 
circumstances it was in the best interest of all concerned to pay certain pre-petition 
creditors out of turn, as an inducement to them to continue working for, or doing 
business with, the debtor.”98  Alluding to the pre-Code evolution of the “Doctrine of 
Necessity,” the chief judge recognized the U.S. Trustee’s point that nothing in the 
modern codification “authorizes, or even contemplates” the early payment of pre-
petition claims.99  More to the point, the bankruptcy courts “are obligated to strictly 
adhere to the priorities established by the Code . . . .”100 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2004). 
95 In re Payless, 268 B.R. at 545. 
96 Id. at 546. 
97 Id.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2004). 
98 In re Payless, 268 B.R. at 545.   
99 Id. 
100 Id.  Parenthetically, the court further noted that it was forbidden from confirming a Chapter 11 
plan if said plan unfairly discriminated among creditors.  Id. 
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 However, the Payless court declared that the current Bankruptcy Code “does 
not absolutely prohibit payment of pre-petition claims prior to confirmation.101  
Judge Federmen noted that Section 549 authorizes Chapter 7 trustees to put aside 
only post-petition payments of pre-petition claims without court approval.102  
Therefore, the court declared that it possessed “some limited power” to authorize 
such obviously preferential treatment of specific pre-petition creditors.103 
 The court then turned to the question of appropriate timing in exercising the 
admittedly circumscribed power.  Returning to Section 364, the Payless court noted 
its wide ability to authorize a debtor to borrow money on terms other than in the 
ordinary course of business and give such lenders an administrative expense 
priority.104 
 In this particular Chapter 11 proceeding, the court found that the lack of 
post-petition financing was a significant factor.  This financing would make the mere 
promise of a priority administrative expense claim far less attractive to potential post-
bankruptcy suppliers105  More was needed, and the Payless court contemplated the 
preferred treatment of paying the pre-petition claims of critical vendors.106 
 In order to grant preferred treatment to critical vendors, Chief Judge 
Federman articulated a six-point test, where the court must ask:  (1) if procedural 
requirements have been met; (2) if the transaction is arms-length; (3) if any 
borrowing is vital to the continuance of the business; (4) if the transaction would 
benefit the estate and its creditors, not just the vendors; (5) if interested parties have 
been represented in the proceedings and, if not, the sophistication of unrepresented 
parties; and (6) the extent to which there is support or opposition from the general 
body of creditors.107 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  See 11 U.S.C. § 549 (2004).  To be sure, the Payless description of Section 549 is not entirely 
accurate.  The statute is broader in permitting a trustee (or debtor in possession) to invalidate such 
post-petition transfers. 
103 In re Payless, 268 B.R. at 545.   
104 Id. at 546-47. 
105 Id. at 547. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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 Applying a new set of principles, the Payless court added that the court “must 
be guided by practicality and common sense.”108  A court sitting in bankruptcy must 
first be satisfied that such goods are “critical to survival of the business.”109  Then the 
bench must decide if the court’s preferential treatment of some creditors “is a better 
result than closing the business, or allowing it to dies slowly for lack of necessary 
supplies.”110  On these points, Chief Justice Federman declared that the views of the 
creditor body were important, particularly the opinions of the unsecured creditors 
who would be most impacted.111 
 In Payless, the court duly noted that the creditors’ committee had approved 
the critical vendor motion.112  Moreover, the chief judge found that ensuring an 
uninterrupted supply of lumber from the critical vendors was vital to the debtor’s 
survival.113  In addition, the amount proposed to be paid to the elite vendors 
constituted less than two percent of the debtor’s pre-petition debt.114  Chief Judge 
Federman found that in return for paying the critical vendors’ pre-petition claims, 
Payless could restock its supplies of lumber, tools, and other goods for sale.115  
Similarly, in applying its own standards, the Payless court found that the lumber 
transactions were arms-length, that the vendors would not do business with the 
debtor absent of the relief requested, and that the debtor had no place else to obtain 
the essential inventory it needed.116  For all these reasons, the Payless court granted 
the “critical vendor” motion.117 
 Just for Feet and Payless not only granted “critical vendor” motions under the 
rubric of the “Doctrine of Necessity,” but both courts also embraced the doctrine 
and its modern day offspring.  Not every lower court has been so welcoming.  Even 
when granting the requested relief, these courts have done so begrudgingly and with 
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a healthy dose of skepticism.  Given this more thoughtful approach, let us examine 
that more critical view of “critical vendor” motions. 
CoServ – A Critical Methodology for Critical Vendor Motions 
In re CoServ, L.L.C.118 is a thorough and recent analysis of the critical vendor 
controversy.  The debtor’s principal business was providing telecommunications 
services and website development and hosting in northern Texas119  As part of its 
“first day” motions, CoServ sought court permission to pay over $2 million in pre-
petition claims, held by over two dozen critical vendors, as part of a plan to maintain 
allegedly essential business relationships post-petition.120   After some earlier debate 
and modification to the proposal, the committee of unsecured creditors and other 
principal creditors acquiesced to the relief requested.121 
 Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Michael Lynn listed three reasons why the lack of 
opposition to the motion was not enough.122  First, the court declared its 
“independent obligation” to ensure that the strictures of the Bankruptcy Code are 
obeyed.123  Second, the United States Trustee had historically taken a position against 
the early payment of pre-petition claims.124  Third, additional vendors were in the 
wings, awaiting the bankruptcy court’s decision.125  If that decision was favorable, 
apparently those vendors would step forward on a “me, too” basis, seeking critical 
vendor classification.126  For these reasons, Bankruptcy Judge Lynn decided a strict 
analysis was necessary. 
 The court posited three questions:  (1) was there authority to pay certain pre-
petition creditors before a reorganization plan was approved; (2) what is the proper 
                                                 
118 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
119 Id. at 489. 
120 Id. at 490. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 490-91. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
66 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [VOL. 6 
test for deciding which claims are thus paid; and (3) which creditors should be 
paid?127 
 As to the first issue, the matter of what authority in law existed for such 
relief, the debtor argued the “Doctrine of Necessity.”128  Significantly, the CoServ 
court did not disagree that it possessed the power to pay pre-petition creditors 
outside of a Chapter 11 plan, “but . . . may do so only under extraordinary 
circumstances.”129  Judge Lynn observed that thousands of debtors have successfully 
emerged from Chapter 11 without paying so-called “critical vendors.”130  In a 
seeming rebuke, the CoServ court faulted the increasing willingness of other courts to 
allow critical vendor payments.131  Notwithstanding the liberality of other bankruptcy 
jurists, “this Court does not believe there has been a sea change in the law that would 
warrant such a drastic expansion of the ‘Doctrine of Necessity,’ a device to be used 
only in rare cases.”132 
 Parenthetically, CoServ noted that the theorem called the “Doctrine of 
Necessity” today is actually the outgrowth of two separate postulations arising before 
the advent of the modern Bankruptcy Code.133  The “Six Months Rule” was rooted 
in railroad receiverships and, in subsequent codifications, only applied to railroad 
reorganizations.134  The “Necessity of Payment Rule,” a common law device, 
paralleled the “Six Months Rule,” for it only dealt with the peculiarities of railroad 
bankruptcies.135  However, “[t]he Rule has occasionally been extended to on-railroad 
debtors.”136  In the first decade of the Code, the “Necessity of Payment” rule was 
used in cases analogous to railroad reorganizations.  The application has a 
concurrently strong emphasis that the Rule was applied to further the “paramount 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 493 n.7. 
134 Id.  See also 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (2004) (found in Subchapter IV of Chapter 11, and restricted to 
railroad reorganizations only). 
135 In re Coserv, L.L.C., 273 B.R. at 493 n.7.   
136 Id. 
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consideration” of Chapter 11, the continued operation and rehabilitation of the 
debtor.137  When the courts extended the “Necessity of Payment” rule to cases 
involving non-railroad debtors, the rule morphed into the current “Doctrine of 
Necessity.”138  
 Continuing its search for statutory authority to pay the pre-bankruptcy claims 
of critical vendors, Judge Lynn rejected allegations that such payments were 
permissible under Section 363 as the utilization of estate property outside the 
ordinary course of business as a power of a debtor in possession under Section 1107, 
or allowed by Section 549 to condone post-petition transfers.139 
 “Only Section 105(a) offers the equitable muscle that would allow a 
bankruptcy court to violate one of the principal tenets of Chapter 11:  that pre-
petition general unsecured claims should be satisfied on an equal basis pursuant to a 
plan.”140  More importantly, Judge Lynn opined that the court’s Section 105 equity 
power is severely circumscribed” and may be employed “only to carry out the 
provisions of Title 11.”141  To be certain, the CoServ court declared that relying upon 
Section 105 to pay critical vendors prior to plan confirmation “is generally inconsistent 
with rather than in furtherance of the Bankruptcy Code.142  That is why such relief can 
only be granted “under the most extraordinary circumstances.”143 
 Judge Lynn found support for this in the overall structure of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  “Congress clearly knew how to place some unsecured claims ahead of 
others,” he observed in looking to the priority scheme of payment so fundamental to 
the insolvency law.144  Similarly, the lawmakers made another deliberate choice by 
allocating “special protections which might lead to post-petition, pre-plan 
                                                 
137 Id. (citing In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 493. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 493, 494 n.9 (emphasis added). 
142 Id. at 494 n.9 (emphasis added). 
143 Id. at 494. 
144 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2004) (priority of payment statute); 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (2004) 
(railroad reorganization priorities)). 
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satisfaction” of unsecured claims elsewhere in the statutes.145  The Corserv bench 
continued, “[T]he entire scheme of the Bankruptcy Code favors equal (and 
simultaneous) treatment” of pre-petition claims.146  This apparent goal of equal 
status, be it in a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 reorganization, “suggests that 
Congress would not approve of a prepetition creditor asserting so-called “critical” 
status to put itself ahead of its peers in the timing of payment; indeed, such 
conniving might well be characterized as “‘economic blackmail.’”147 
 The situation is different when the vendor’s own solvency is put at risk by 
the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  Vendors need not risk going into bankruptcy 
themselves, which is precisely why Congress crafted mechanisms such as deposits 
and cash on delivery payments, among other devices to ensure against further losses 
by the creditors post-petition.  If such devices are inadequate to assure the vendor 
for purposes of continuing to deal with the debtor post-petition, this may open the 
door to extraordinary relief.148 
 Following its cogent analysis of the Bankruptcy Code, the CoServ court 
turned to the applicable case precedents.  There it found, at best, “mixed support” 
for the debtor’s application.149  Judge Lynn’s own circuit had come “perilously close” 
to the bright line rule adopted by the bankruptcy courts of Montana in refusing to 
elevate pre-petition claims to a higher level of priority.150  Specifically, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “took almost as hard a line” in In re Oxford Management, 
Inc.151 While Oxford was distinguishable upon its precise facts, the CoServ court still 
                                                 
145 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 546(c), (d) (2004) (rights reclamation); 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (2004) (allowing 
post-petition perfection of a security interest securing a pre-bankruptcy indebtedness); 11 U.S.C. § 366 
(2004) (special treatment for utilities)). 
146 Id. at 494 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 726, 1122, 1129(b)(1) (2004). 
147 Id. (quoting In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 932 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998) (early 
payment of selective pre-petition debt should not be authorized “as a result of threats or coercion by 
disgruntled creditors.”  Id.  Such behavior violates the automatic stay and jeopardizes the basic tenets 
of equality of treatment for similarly situated creditors.). 
148 Id. at 494-95. 
149 Id. at 495. 
150 Id. at 495 (citing In re Timberhouse Post & Beam, Ltd., 196 B.R. 547, 550-51 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
1996)). 
151 4 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
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regarded its outlook as determinative in barring early payment of pre-petition claims, 
a precept reflected in other Fifth Circuit holdings.152 
 Judge Lynn then looked to Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The CoServ court 
expressed doubt that the Supreme Court would assume it had broad discretion to 
approve critical vendor payments; although that assumption would not be sensible in 
light of the Court’s recent decisions barring subordination of claims.153  Paying 
critical vendors may not equate to subordinating tax claims, but nonetheless, “it has 
the smell of a similar inappropriate adjustment of congressionally established 
priorities” and flies in the face of Supreme Court edicts.154  In conclusion, Coserv 
ruled, “even a cursory review of the law makes clear that this Court does not possess 
the broad powers” to approve critical vendor claims as requested by the debtor.155  
Clearly, such wide authority was absent.  But then the bench turned to the next 
question:  can a bankruptcy court ever authorize critical vendor payments?156 
 To answer this question, the CoServ court perceived the issue as largely a 
matter of the debtor’s obligations, the first of which was to act as a fiduciary to 
creditors and protect and preserve the estate, including the going concern value of an 
operational business.157  Judge Lynn opined that “[t]here are occasions when this 
duty can only be fulfilled by the preplan satisfaction of a prepetition claim.”158  The 
court cited as examples the payment of foreign creditors beyond the reach of a U.S. 
bankruptcy court, refunds to customers to preserve their business, and the payment 
of license fees, albeit pre-petition in nature, whose loss would have been 
detrimental.159  “It may be that payment of a prepetition unsecured claim is the only 
means to effect a substantial enhancement of the estate,” observed Judge Lynn.160  
                                                 
152 In re Coserv L.L.C., 273 B.R. at 495.  See In re AWECO, 725 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 880 (1984) (pre-plan compromise and payment of an unsecured claim prohibited as violative 
of the absolute priority rule). 
153 In re Coserv L.L.C., 273 B.R. at 495 (citing United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); United 
States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996)).  
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Thus, “it is only logical” to call upon the broad powers of Section 105 to authorize 
the early satisfaction of pre-petition claims to preserve or enhance a debtor’s 
estate.161   
At the end of the day, the CoServ court was satisfied that, in the right 
circumstances, it could order the kind of relief requested by the debtor.162  But this 
court was left wholly unsatisfied with the present state of the case law on this 
subject, finding that none of the cases established a clear set of rules for principled 
decision-making in such matters.163   
 To answer his final question, Judge Lynn set out to articulate his own 
standard for critical vendor motions.164  First, the court in CoServ was careful to 
declare that the equitable power to be used here “should be used sparingly,” and 
then only within specific parameters.165  In promulgating its own test, the court 
explicitly rejected reliance upon amorphous standards such as “essential to the 
continued operation of the debtor,” for reason that such vague rationales simply did 
not provide real guidance.166  Without meaningful precedents, Judge Lynn criticized, 
ill-advised “critical vendor” motions sprout like weeds.167 
 Judge Lynn’s test was formulated upon three points:  First, it was imperative 
that the debtor and the vendor continue to do business.  Second, there must be a 
likelihood of harm unless the debtor maintains a good business relationship with the 
vendor and the impact of that harm would be “disproportionate to the amount of 
the claimant’s pre-petition claim.”168  Third, the debtor must be out of options—it 
lacks either a practical or legal way to deal with the claimant, except for acceding to 
the vendor’s demand that its pre-petition claim be paid as a condition to transacting 
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post-petition business.169  A “critical vendor” motion can be granted if these three 
conditions can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.170 
 With the more arduous part of the opinion completed, the CoServ bench 
turned to apply its new test to the facts at bar.  Here, the debtor achieved mixed 
results for, to coin a phrase, some vendors turned out to be more critical than 
others.171  In truth, which creditors had their pre-petition claims paid early as critical 
vendors and which did not obtain such favorable status is irrelevant.  The point is 
that the bankruptcy court in CoServ added an erudite analysis to the controversy of 
critical vendor motions.  The power of this opinion cannot be underestimated, as it 
concludes by yet again emphasizing that well-established law demands granting 
critical vendor relief only in “the most extraordinary circumstances.”172 
Mirant Energizes the Controversy 
 The bankruptcy court in In re Mirant Corp.173 supplied another intriguing 
perspective.  Mirant and its affiliates were among the most essential providers of 
power throughout the United States.  Thus, the reorganization case posed some 
rather troublesome issues in need of swift and just resolution.174  Because of the 
potentially harmful effects on the nation’s economy if Mirant’s operations were 
disrupted, the debtor requested expedited relief, including the right to pay so-called 
“critical vendors.”175 
 This troubled Bankruptcy Judge Lynn, for he had grave misgivings about 
granting such requests, as he had previously expressed in the CoServ case.176  In 
writing the Mirant opinion, Judge Lynn reiterated his “reservations about granting 
such relief when to do so could result in certain favored unsecured creditors 
receiving treatment preferential to that received by other unsecured creditors under a 
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173 296 B.R. 427 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003). 
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[Chapter 11] plan.”177  In the case at bar, the bench voiced concern that the 
compressed time frame had virtually excluded the U.S. Trustee and other interested 
parties from meaningful participation in the hearings.178 
 The Mirant court announced that its desired course in such matters was to 
treat vendors on a case-by-case basis and to grant preferential treatment based on 
evaluation of several factors.  The court must evaluate:  whether the weight of the 
evidence demonstrates necessity of the debtor/vendor relationship, the risk of harm 
that will result if the debtor cannot deal with the vendor, and finally, the lack of any 
practical or legal alternative to compel the vendor to continue to do business with 
the debtor except immediate payment of the pre-bankruptcy claim.179  A bankruptcy 
court could require positive proof of all three of these elements.180  Businesses in 
Chapter 11 are usually in dire straits, particularly in those early, problematic days of 
reorganization.  In the instant case, any loss of a vital vendor relationship could have 
been “disastrous.”181  Furthermore, because critical vendor payments have “become 
commonplace in some jurisdictions,” the Mirant court acknowledged that some 
vendors have come to expect and demand such extraordinary treatment, regardless 
of the holdings in CoServ or similarly minded cases.182 
 Given all these weighty concerns, the bankruptcy judge admitted that he 
could not risk the consequences of damage to this debtor’s operations, by delaying to 
handle the critical vendor request the way he wished.183 
 Accordingly, the Mirant court conditioned relief for “critical” vendors in the 
following way:  the debtor was first authorized to pay the pre-petition debt of any 
creditor claiming secured status, providing that Mirant, in its business judgment as to 
the best interests of its estate, believed the lien asserted was valid and would make 
the amount of the debt only to the extent the debtor believed necessary.184 
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 Second, calling upon the multiple requirements enumerated in Corserv, the 
debtor was authorized to pay pre-petition claims that passed the Corserv test.185  As a 
further protection, the debtor was ordered to file a schedule of payments made 
under either of these two methods with the U.S. Trustee and the creditors 
committee, thus insuring some oversight to the process.186 
 Third, the court gave Mirant permission to pay the pre-petition claim of any 
vendor that refused to do business with them unless such pre-bankruptcy debt was 
paid, and where Mirant, in its best business judgment, reasonably believed continuing 
to trade with the vendor was essential to Mirant’s business187  Notably, Judge Lynn 
appended some strenuous provisions to this last grant of authority.  If the debtor 
believed this vendor’s claim failed the CoServ test, it could move for a determination 
of “ordinariness” of the claim and recover the sums already paid.188  Furthermore, 
any vendor that demands recognition as a critical vendor, but still refuses to deal 
with the debtor, would be subject to sanctions.189 
 Judge Lynn took one final step to ensure compliance with his mandate:  any 
vendor put on notice of the instant order would be sanctioned if it still refused, 
absent good cause, to conduct post-petition business with the debtor even though 
the vendor was assured via deposit or prepayment that its post-petition goods would 
be properly purchased.190 
 Mirant was light on legal substance, but that was not surprising or untoward.  
After all, Judge Lynn firmly grounded Mirant upon CoServ.  Why be unduly 
repetitive? 
 The legal rational thus incorporated by reference, the opinion was free to be 
eminently practical.  As we will elaborate upon later, Mirant, rendered in the heat of 
battle, does not suffer for the haste of its issuance.  Rather, its firm grasp of the 
dilemma of “critical vendor” motions makes it a template for the future. 
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 By any measure, the twin prongs of CoServ and Mirant were a better reasoned, 
more thoughtful attack on “critical vendor” motions.  But they were but a prelude to 
the true onslaught, destined to bring down such motions.  Next, critical vendor relief 
is besieged by a higher court, one of the nation’s pre-eminent appellate courts, in the 
next case for our consideration. 
Kmart – Rejecting “Critical Vendor” Motions 
We now come to Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp.,191 the pivotal case that 
may prove to be either the catalyst for cataclysmic change or merely the perpetuation 
of the status quo.  This pivotal case of course arises from the travails of the troubled 
retailer.  While the last words have not yet been spoken, we can thoroughly examine 
the first and second opinings of judicial wisdom. 
 In Kmart, the bankruptcy court previously issued four final orders authorizing 
Kmart to pay certain pre-petition obligations before it proposed a plan of 
reorganization providing for the treatment of all claims under a unitary plan.192  
These orders were issued pursuant to “critical vendor” motions.193 
 Kmart alleged the earlier payments were vital to maintain relationships 
essential to its efforts to stay in business and reorganize.  Accordingly, Kmart 
justified its request under the “Doctrine of Necessity.”194  The bankruptcy judge 
agreed with Kmart, authorizing certain “critical vendor” payments; Capital Factors, a 
creditor who was receiving nothing for its pre-petition claim, objected and 
appealed.195 
 District Judge Grady chose to first examine the bankruptcy court’s power 
under Section 105 to authorize the critical vendor payments.196  This inevitably 
compelled the reviewing court to analyze the “Doctrine of Necessity.”  While the 
bankruptcy court did not invoke the doctrine by name, Kmart’s reliance upon it was 
explicit.197  Considering the bankruptcy court’s invocation of terms such as 
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“necessary,” “integral” and the like,198 there could be no mistake that the “Doctrine 
of Necessity” was the cornerstone of the relief requested and granted below. 
 Because the doctrine is equitable and not codified within the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code, Judge Grady concluded that the doctrine could only be applied by 
way of Section 105-the Code’s grant of general equitable powers to the bankruptcy 
courts.  The exercise of that equitable power pursuant to Section 105 is limited to 
what is “necessary to enforce the [statutory] provisions of the Code,” but a judge 
may not unilaterally engraft new powers onto the Code as he or she sees fit.199  This 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s edict that any “authority give to the 
bankruptcy courts under § 105 must be exercised within the [written] confines of the 
. . . Code” itself.200 
 As Sections 503 and 507 provide, specific requirements must be met to 
classify claims for priority of payment at the end of any case.  As the district court 
noted, “[t]he Code does not carve out priority or administrative expense status for 
prepetition general unsecured claims based on the ‘critical’ or ‘integral’ status of a 
creditor.”201  Nevertheless, that is what the bankruptcy court did when it altered the 
statutory priority scheme by “elevat[ing] the claims of the ‘critical’ vendors” and 
subordinating the claims of all other general, unsecured creditors.202 
 Can courts rightly usurp the statutory priorities merely by invoking Section 
105?  District Judge Grady observed that there is a split of authority on the subject.  
Several bankruptcy judges “and a handful of district courts” have held that 
bankruptcy courts can authorize such critical vendor motions.203  Conversely, “a 
number of courts of appeals and a few lower courts have held just the opposite.”204  
The Kmart court allied itself with this camp.  “[W]e cannot ignore the Bankruptcy 
Code’s statutory scheme of priority in favor of ‘equity,’” opined Judge Grady.205  The 
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equitable nature of bankruptcy proceedings does not give bankruptcy courts the 
unlimited discretion to reconfigure statutory rights.206 
 The district court acknowledged the well-intended and even possibly 
beneficial results to be obtained from applying the “Doctrine of Necessity” through 
Section 105 to the case at bar.207  It is likely that allowing pre-plan payments to select 
creditors would minimize business disruptions and promote a successful 
reorganization; however, this utility and practicality does not make up for the lack of 
statutory authorization.208  Judge Grady concluded that by not codifying the 
“Doctrine of Necessity” into the Bankruptcy Code, Congress freely elected to leave 
the priority scheme of payment intact.209  Thus, finding that the court below lacked 
the statutory or equitable power to authorize the critical vendor payments, the 
district court reversed the bankruptcy judge’s orders.210 
 Additionally, the debtor raised another issue on appeal to preserve the relief 
granted by the bankruptcy court.  Kmart argued the principle of equitable mootness, 
asserting that substantial payments to selected vendors under the lower court’s order 
rendered futile any alteration to that result.211  The district court was not persuaded 
by this argument.  First, noting that it was highly unlikely for the bankruptcy judge to 
stay his own orders pending appeal, the district court relieved that appellant of the 
ordinary requirement of obtaining a stay to preserve its rights on appeal.212 
 More to the point, the entire theory of equitable mootness was largely 
anathematized from this venue by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re UNR Indus., 
Inc.,213 where the prominent Circuit Judge Easterbrook recognized the significant 
distinction between the inability and the unwillingness to alter outcomes on appeal.214  
Rather, the fundamental questions left behind are the basic fairness to affected 
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parties and the overall propriety to undo on appeal what the bankruptcy court did 
below.215  Parenthetically, Judge Grady found it noteworthy that the once-named 
equitable mootness doctrine had its greatest application to appeals of confirmed 
plans of reorganization.216  Considering the evolved, yet nameless, doctrine, Judge 
Grady held that “it is not too late” to reverse the decision below and that the critical 
vendors could be ordered to repay the previously received funds.217 
 Moreover, the district court flatly rejected the debtor’s “doomsday 
speculations” of reorganization paralysis and the supposedly Herculean task of suing 
allegedly thousands of vendors to recover hundreds of millions of dollars.218  Giving 
no credibility to Kmart’s assertions, the court declared there was no evidence the 
debtor would have to litigate, given the bankruptcy judge’s power to simply order the 
return of the very funds paid out pursuant to his earlier ruling.219  Finally, the district 
judge succinctly rejected the debtor’ lenders’ alternative argument that the critical 
vendor payments could be justified as payments of adequate protection under 
Section 361.220  Because the bankruptcy court did not base its ruling upon adequate 
protection grounds, there was no basis to allow the decision below to stand. 
 For the forgoing reasons, the bankruptcy court’s critical vendor order was 
reversed.  However, far more important, the district court in Kmart most likely struck 
a fatal blow, not only to “critical vendor” motions, but to the “Doctrine of 
Necessity” itself.  Nonetheless, more was to be said. 
The Seventh Circuit’s Declaration 
 The much-awaited appeal of Kmart to the Seventh Circuit followed.221  As the 
highest court to recently confront the issue, the Seventh Circuit’s decision might well 
be the last word.  Yet, because of the complexity of the issue and the potential 
impact on bankruptcy practice, the United States Supreme Court may still hear it.  
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But before we cross a bridge yet to be built, let us examine the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision. 
 At the outset, it is worth noting that fans of the Seventh Circuit’s hard-
driving school of law and economic pragmatism will not be disappointed with the 
opinion.  True to form, the Seventh Circuit quickly recapped the facts, but even that 
brief preamble was most insightful into the panel’s way of thinking.  Analyzing the 
“theory behind the request,” Judge Easterbrook posited that “[f]ull payment to 
critical-vendors thus could in principle make even the disfavored creditors better 
off” because, theoretically, even they will garner a larger recovery because the 
debtor’s current operations will be sustained.222  But there is always a catch.  The 
court found this theorem “implies . . . the debtor must prove, and not just allege,” 
that vendors would halt all business with the debtor unless their pre-petition claims 
were paid immediately; and the debtor will realize a net gain from the continued 
transactions with the elite vendors sufficient “to provide some residual benefit to the 
remaining, disfavored creditors, or at least leave them no worse off.”223   
 The Seventh Circuit then proceeded to relentlessly criticize the original 
actions taken by the bankruptcy court.  In sharp words, Judge Easterbrook noted the 
bankruptcy court’s unfaltering acceptance of the critical vendors order as proposed 
by Kmart, the lack of notice to disfavored—i.e. non-critical—creditors, a lack of 
pertinent evidence (Judge Easterbrook made a scathing comment about “unhelpful” 
testimony by debtor’s CEO, “who could not speak for vendors”), and an utter lack 
of factual finding as to the impact of the relief upon the disenfranchised, general 
creditor body.224  The court characterized the original relief as “open-ended” and as 
allowing an “exercise of unilateral discretion” by Kmart.225  Clearly, the panel found 
the lower court’s actions grossly improper. 
 Continuing, the Seventh Circuit noted that Kmart used its unchecked power 
to pay well over two thousand vendors a total of some $300 million, the money 
coming from a $2 billion post-petition credit facility.226  This left some two thousand 
non-critical vendors, not to mention more than forty-three thousand general 
unsecured creditors, out in the cold until Kmart finally distributed about ten cents on 
the dollar, “mostly in [new] stock of the reorganized Kmart,” after eventual approval 
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of debtor’s Chapter 11 plan.227  This fact was pivotal because the district court 
reversed the bankruptcy judge’s order just at about the same time Kmart emerged 
from bankruptcy.  This led to the first legal argument of note. 
 As stated, Bankruptcy Judge Susan Pierson Sonderby’s alacrity in moving 
Kmart to a fairly swift emergence from bankruptcy, combined with the usual 
progression of the critical vendors order, resulted in both events occurring nearly 
simultaneously.  Thus, Kmart’s initial argument was that the instant appeal had been 
rendered a moot point.  As characterized by Judge Easterbrook, the debtor’s salient 
point was “it was too late.  Money had changed hands” and could not be refunded.228  
With utter pragmatism, the tribunal responded that reversing preferential transfers229 
“is an ordinary feature of bankruptcy practice,” often undertaken post-bankruptcy 
pursuant to a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.230  Unmistakably signaling where it was 
heading, the appellate court opined that if the critical vendor order was flawed, then 
such fortunate vendors received nothing more than a preferential payment, easily 
recoverable under bankruptcy norms.231  To be sure, plan confirmation normally 
does not end the administration of the debtor’s estate.232 
 Additionally, in counterpoise are several specific Bankruptcy Code sections 
that shelter particular orders for relief from reversal.233  But critical vendor orders are 
afforded no such protection.  The panel sharply stated, “[N]othing comparable 
anywhere in the Code” exists for such decisions; “[j]udges do not invent missing 
language.”234 
 Admittedly, the Seventh Circuit has recognized the longstanding doctrine of 
equitable mootness when a Chapter 11 plan has already been confirmed.235  But the 
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instant situation is different because the Kmart plan provided for the initiation of 
adversary proceedings to recover preferential transfers, which the tribunal again 
characterized as critical vendor payments.236  Kmart’s equitable mootness argument 
was an attempt to usurp its own plan by way of a collateral attack—an attempt the 
court would not allow.237 
 Furthermore, the circuit court declined to find detrimental reliance on the 
part of the critical vendors.  The court said to continue to do business with a debtor 
post-petition “may or may not be a form of reliance,” but is certainly not detrimental 
reliance.238  Arguably, if Kmart had never emerged from bankruptcy, it might then 
make sense to permit the vendors to keep the critical vendor payments to offset 
post-petition deficiencies.  But that was not the case here, as the debtor had emerged 
from Chapter 11.239  In sum, the critical vendors had no reliance and, moreover, no 
language in the Bankruptcy Code posed an obstacle to recover the payments made to 
them.240 
 “Thus we arrive at the merits,” Judge Easterbrook announced.241  Wasting no 
words, the Seventh Circuit addressed the scope of power bestowed by Section 105, 
the provision that the bankruptcy court relied upon to approve the critical vendor 
motion.  Here, the tribunal explicitly rejected the bankruptcy court’s view and ratified 
the district court’s perspective.242  The court firmly declared that Section 105 “does 
not create discretion to set aside the Code’s rules . . . [and] the power conferred by § 
105(a) is one to implement rather than override.”243  Indeed, every circuit to 
previously address the question has ruled affirmatively that the statute does not 
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support full payment to certain unsecured creditors unless the entire class of 
unsecured creditors is made whole.244 
 The Seventh Circuit agreed with its brethren.  Bankruptcy jurists do not have 
unbridled discretion to rearrange rights and priorities despite the fact that bankruptcy 
proceedings are inherently equitable in nature.245  The court noted that the “Doctrine 
of Necessity” “is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code” rooted in 
judicial practices of wielding far ranging powers to reprioritize creditors at will in a 
bygone era “before bankruptcy law was codified.”246  The tribunal declared, “[T]oday 
it is the Code rather than the norms of a Nineteenth Century railroad reorganization 
that must prevail.”247  Miltenberger and Fosdick predated even the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898.248  The tribunal found germane the fact that the first attempt at organizing the 
nations’ insolvency laws near the turn of the Twentieth Century was fully supplanted 
by the modern codification over twenty-five years ago.249  Writing for the panel, 
Judge Easterbrook held that the modern Code “supplies the rules” today.250  It is 
useless to ask if Congress intended to discard old common law doctrines “because 
[Congress] did not need to; the Act curtailed, and then the Code replaced, the entire 
apparatus.”251 
 Simply put, the solutions to today’s problems lie in the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The Seventh Circuit unequivocally ruled that if archaic pre-Code 
practices survive, it is “as glosses on ambiguous language” within the Code, “but not 
on freestanding entitlements to trump the text.”252  The tribunal made clear that the 
answers to the controversy before it are to be found within the Code itself. 
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 Judge Easterbrook looked to the Code and first asked if it had some proviso 
permitting debtors to favor some vendors over others.253  The Court found that most 
of the modern Code specifies equal treatment or sets forth a particularized scheme 
of priority when claims exceed assets.254   
Kmart offered several sections of the Code that authorized disparate 
treatment and the panel dissected them, one by one.255  First, the debtor offered 
Section 364(b), which allows the estate to incur post-petition debt and give it 
priority, as Kmart did in this situation.256  The court held that the statute does not, 
however, say anything about disturbing the money or rearranging creditor 
priorities.257  By rejecting Section 364(b) as a valid basis for critical vendor payments, 
the Seventh Circuit rejected Payless and similar cases for their contrary reasoning.258 
The court next looked at what of Section 503 regulates administrative 
expenses.  The panel ruled it “irrelevant” because pre-petition debt owed to vendors, 
critical or otherwise, is not a post-bankruptcy cost of administration.259  They are 
antithetical.  To say otherwise would merge old debt with new, post-petition 
expenses that would condemn a reorganizing debtor to failure.260 
The last statute that Kmart relied upon to justify its critical vendor relief was 
Section 363(b)(1).  The appellate court initially found this section promising, since it 
authorized use of estate property outside the ordinary course.261  Paying the pre-
petition debt of critical vendors in order to keep needed supplies flowing could be 
construed as an extraordinary use.262  The appellee argued that the statute 
contemplated, and Section 363(b)(1) should be limited to, extraordinary expenditures 
for long-term, capital projects, not antecedent debts; paying old vendors is clearly an 
                                                 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 872. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
261 Id.  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2004). 
262 Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872. 
2004]         CRITICAL VENDOR MOTIONS AND THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY 83 
ordinary course of business exercise263  To hold to the contrary would invite disaster 
because it would give bankruptcy judges carte blanche to resist creditor priorities 
without reference to the Code.264 
Judge Easterbrook opined that priority of payment can change in bankruptcy 
if supported by a statute.265  Section 363(b)(1) might be such a law.  The tribunal, 
acting as a model of judicial restraint, made two rulings.  The court first held that if 
Section 363(b)(1) was too liberal, then that was an issue for Congress, rather than the 
courts, to remedy.266  The Seventh Circuit next decreed it wise to interpret Section 
363(b)(1) “to do the least damage possible to priorities established by contract and 
by other parts of the Bankruptcy Code.”267  The tribunal thus decided that it need 
not resolve that precise issue in the present case because the critical vendor relief 
ordered by the bankruptcy court was fatally flawed, no matter the interpretation 
ascribed to Section 363(b)(1).268 
The tribunal then turned to the evolution of the critical vendor order itself.  
Judge Easterbrook described the relief in Kmart as premised on the belief that critical 
vendors had to be retained via payment so that all creditors could benefit from a 
successful Chapter 11 reorganization.269  This suggested a use of Section 363(b)(1) 
similar to a “cramdown” reorganization plan upon dissenting creditors where such 
creditors would be at least as well off under a Chapter 11 plan of which they did not 
approve than if the debtor was liquidated.270  This notion presupposed a 
demonstration that the dissenting creditors would do the same or better with the 
plan as in a Chapter 7 proceeding, a showing Kmart never attempted.271  Additionally, 
there must be evidence that critical vendors would stop doing business with the 
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debtor.  Without such proof of abandonment by unsatisfied creditors, preferential 
treatment for select vendors would not be necessary.272 
The tribunal observed that some critical vendors would still trade with the 
debtor “because they must.”273  In Kmart, Fleming Companies, the largest beneficiary 
of the bankruptcy court’s order, was in such a position.  It supplied nearly $100 
million in groceries to Kmart each week.274  Fleming could not cut off the debtor 
even if it wanted to do so.  It was contractually and legally bound to Kmart. 275 It was 
superfluous to treat Fleming as a critical vendor for doing something it could not 
avoid doing.  The panel found it unlikely that Fleming would have stopped dealing 
with Kmart, because every post-petition delivery meant fresh profit.  No sane vendor 
would turn away new money because of old debt—that “would be a self-inflicted 
wound.”276  The final proof was that Fleming collapsed and went bankrupt when its 
contract expired and Kmart took its business elsewhere.277  The court observed that 
the typical justification for critical vendor relief is highly suspect because no vendor 
commits financial suicide.278 
The panel acknowledged the general hesitancy of vendors to “throw good 
money after bad” by continuing to do business with a debtor that already owes the 
supplier significant amounts of money.279  Such concerns are not properly allayed, 
however, by bestowing critical vendor status.  Rather, in the post-petition arena, cash 
payments or the presence a of D.I.P. credit facility are used to encourage existing 
vendors to keep supplies flowing.280  Kmart’s failure to do so was its undoing.  Judge 
Easterbrook chastised Kmart for rejecting C.O.D. payments “as if a litigant’s 
druthers could override the rights of third parties.”281  As previously noted, Kmart 
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had a war chest of $2 million in its post-petition credit facility.  “Some of that credit 
could have been used to assure vendors” of payment for post-bankruptcy goods.282  
In short, Kmart had alternatives that it chose not to pursue. 
The tribunal faulted the bankruptcy judge for not considering any form of 
relief other than the “critical vendor” motion Kmart brought forth.  The bankruptcy 
judge never investigated whether any vendor would have ceased doing business with 
Kmart.283  The meager record below would not have supported such a conclusion.  
The Seventh Circuit faulted the court below for finding that preferring critical 
vendors was the only solution to foster reorganization and that the disenfranchised 
creditors benefited from the grant of critical vendor relief.284 
The tribunal declared that even if Section 363(b)(1) could be properly read to 
authorize critical vendor payments, “preferential payments to a class of creditors are 
proper only if the record shows the prospect of benefit to the other creditors.”285  
Because this scant record did not, the critical vendor order could not stand.  The 
circuit court affirmed the district court’s reversal of the bankruptcy judge.286 
That is where the case law presently stands.  “Critical vendor” motions have 
suffered a seemingly fatal blow.  The “Doctrine of Necessity” has fallen or is very 
near collapse.  But some analysis is in order before we celebrate the demise of these 
two misbegotten doctrines. 
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY 
The Supreme Court’s Edicts of a Century Past 
The first part of our analysis requires an examination of the Nineteenth 
Century opinions of the Supreme Court.  These opinions deserve respect, for it is 
not their advanced age that detracts from their precedential value today.  Rather, it is 
the inescapable fact that they were decided in the narrow context of railroad 
reorganizations that occurred over a century ago.  It is not the opinions themselves 
that are so troubling, but the modern misapprehensions about their true meaning. 
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Having dealt with these Supreme Court opinions at length, wasteful 
repetition is unnecessary.  Nonetheless, their salient points can and should be 
repeated. 
First, the “Six Month Rule” is an illusion, for nowhere in Fosdick do the 
Justices even hint at, let alone clearly articulate, such a principle of common law.  
Mitleberger is no less an apparition.  The vague specters found in those decisions do 
not make law.  While the factual circumstances from which these cases arose are 
important, these phantoms never coalesce into tangible axioms. 
Second, these holdings were rendered in the discrete venue of railroad 
reorganizations.  For reason of legal distinctions, practical business considerations, 
and common sense, it is not possible to compare these rules from a century ago to 
modern bankruptcy cases involving today’s diversified industry sectors.  The realities 
of running a railroad in the Eighteen-Eighties have no relevance to propping up a 
retail debtor in the Twenty-first Century.  Just as steam locomotives are no longer 
depended upon for transportation across the continent, pragmatism demands we 
leave such dogma in the historical archives where it belongs. 
Third, the acute fact that the old notions of the “Six Month Rule” and the 
“Doctrine of Necessity” never made it into the Bankruptcy Code emboldened the 
Seventh Circuit in Kmart to decry the rationale of “critical vendor” motions.  
Congress had over ninety years of history to ponder when the modern codification 
was promulgated in 1978, yet Congress chose to ignore it.  It would be pure folly to 
suggest that the archaic practices of that era were surreptitiously subsumed into the 
Code.  To do so presumes a level of either deceit or stupidity on the part of our 
lawmakers that cannot be countenanced.  Congress not only failed to codify these 
hoary old tales into law in 1978, but the legislators also declined to adopt them as law 
when enacting the Bankruptcy Act of 1898—a time much closer, chronologically and 
circumstantially, to the heyday of Fosdick and Miltenberger. 
The Supreme Court’s foretelling of the day of the “critical vendor” motion is 
truly amazing.  The similarity and sometimes identical choice of words is uncanny.  
This is unmistakably the wellspring of inspiration for today’s proponents of critical 
vendor relief.  Admittedly, their arguments are not wholly lacking in merit, however 
thin these merits may be. 
But it is all for naught.  The Supreme Court’s pronouncements of the late 
Nineteenth Century, a day of steam engines and horse-drawn carriages, cannot be 
extended beyond their narrow world to be broadly applied in today’s world of multi-
state retailers and e-commerce.  These antiquated opinions have little modern value; 
were never woven into the fabric of today’s bankruptcy law.  We should respect 
them, but we cannot rely upon them. 
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Courts of a Feather Fail Together 
 In our analysis, we can likewise make short work of the opinions favoring 
critical vendor relief.  Since they proceed along common paths, we can group them 
together and, thus, refute them. 
 Each of the decisions in favor of “critical vendor” motions began with the 
same highly erroneous premise.  This threshold flaw is so debilitating as to be nearly 
fatal.  This mortal blow is the unwarranted and clearly erroneous expansion of 
Section 105 beyond comprehensible and sensible boundaries. 
 The court cases we have cited state the case well enough.  We merely reflect 
upon their well-founded holding that Section 105 can solely be read and applied 
within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.  We cannot venture beyond the written 
text of what Congress has declared to be our nation’s insolvency law; to do so would 
be dangerous and wholly unnecessary.  No one denies the inherently equitable nature 
of bankruptcy proceedings.  No one challenges the broad, equitable powers of 
bankruptcy judges to fashion appropriate relief in such cases.  No one refutes the 
intention of Congress to grant wide powers to the courts under Section 105 to 
accomplish their mandate.  Yet none of this is carte blanche to the courts of 
bankruptcy to range far and wide over the landscape and dispense justice as they see 
fit under the rubric of Section 105.  As with everything, this statute has rational 
limits.  However, the courts granting vendor relief have routinely exceeded those 
limits.  This is a large part of their undoing and reason why these motions are 
doomed to failure as excessive and wrongful exercises of nonexistent powers. 
The “Plain Language” Admonition 
 The central role of Section 105 in cases drives much of the preceding and 
subsequent analysis.  The point is simple:  the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code 
controls.  Otherwise, what follows does not make sense.  Certainly, the plain 
language doctrine has endured for countless ages and has displayed no signs of 
diminishing vigor.  The Supreme Court has employed it time and again to a variety 
of situations calling for statutory interpretation. 
 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code is one statutory body to which the Supreme 
Court has applied the maxim with forcefulness.  Among the many landmarks, 
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain287 stands out as the tip of the spear in declaring 
that plain language controls.  Supreme Court precedents make abundantly clear “that 
                                                 
287 503 U.S. 249 (1992). 
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the starting point for . . . analysis is the statutory text.”288  Where “the words are 
ambiguous, the ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”289   
The commandments of statutory interpretation require no embellishment 
here.  In the context of critical vendor relief, we have seen courts err in going beyond 
the scope of Section 105’s plain language.  When citing additional statutory portions 
of the Bankruptcy Code to support their actions, the same error is committed.  The 
cases that follow comport with the rule of plain language concerning Section 105.  
These opinions read and follow the statute plainly. 
CoServ and Mirant – A More Reasonable Approach 
 In this analysis, one cannot underestimate the value of the decisions of 
Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Michael Lynn in CoServ and Mirant.  In many ways, these 
cases presaged what is now the penultimate opinion on the issue by the Seventh 
Circuit in Kmart.  Yet the affirmation of the bankruptcy court’s viewpoints by an 
appellate court, albeit by a different court, is but one element that underscores the 
former’s wisdom. 
 Initially, Bankruptcy Judge Lynn proceeded from a sound foundation—a 
firm adherence to the plain statutory text of the controlling law.  The court rightly 
noted that there is a distinct and unmistakable lack of clear statutory authority for 
“critical vendor” motions.  Additionally, only the broad grant of authority bestowed 
by Section 105 might conceivably be interpreted to permit the out-of-order payment 
of certain pre-petition debt.  But Coserv and Mirant rightly warned that such an 
interpretation should not be taken lightly from the general statute.  Most of all, 
Section 105 should not be tortured so as to supposedly yield a remedial power that 
Congress never intended to grant to the courts. 
 Second, justification for paying so-called critical vendors should not be 
forcibly extracted from other statutory provisions.  By enacting the modern 
Bankruptcy Code in 1978, Congress set in place various operative provisions to do 
                                                 
288 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (employment discrimination case brought 
under Civil Rights Act of 1964) (citing Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 
(1992)). 
289 Id. (quoting Germain, 503 U.S. at 254).  See also Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters 
Bank N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000). * Associate Professor of Law, The Peter J. Tobin College of Business, 
St. John’s University, New York, and partner, Sabino & Sabino, P.C., New York.  The author 
dedicates this Article to the Honorable E. Donald Shapiro, Dean Emeritus and The Joseph Solomon 
Distinguished Professor of Law, New York Law School, with profound thanks for his years of 
encouragement, support, and, most of all, true friendship, which made this Article and a great many 
other things possible. 
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specific, discrete tasks, such as allowing for the sales or use of property.  These Code 
sections should neither be indiscriminately applied to purportedly solve problems 
beyond their scope nor grant relief in situations where the lawmakers never intended 
relief to be given.  If Congress wanted to empower those statutes to do the 
additional tasks that proponents of “critical vendor” motions claimed they could do, 
Congress could have done so by writing the law in that way.  “Each in its own place” 
is the motto here. 
 Third, the crowning achievement of both Coserv and Mirant is the 
establishment of a rigorous test for permitting critical vendor relief, if at all.  Judge 
Lynn recognized that many judges simply took the debtor’s outcry for granted or did 
not delve deeply enough into the merits of a “critical vendor” motion before 
granting it.  Such a relaxed approach is banished by these two decisions.  In its place, 
Coserv and Mirant rightly install a disciplined process of fact-finding and 
adjudication—which leads to principled decision-making. 
 To be sure, Coserv and Mirant still err in granting critical vendor relief.  Still, if 
such relief is ever to be granted, then Judge Lynn’s proactive measures lend 
discipline and credibility to the result that was surely lacking before.  Because of the 
principled decision-making in CoServ and Mirant, their predecessors pale in 
comparison, due to a multitude of sins. 
 The first and most common mistake is the extrapolation from Section 105 of 
a power to pay pre-petition debts out of sequence.  Undeniably, Section 105 
espouses a broad, general grant of power to the bankruptcy courts to do what is right 
and necessary.  Yet that is not carte blanche  from the lawmakers who wrote the 
insolvency laws.  The Supreme Court has warned time and again that the capabilities 
of Section 105 must be confirmed within the explicit text of the Bankruptcy Code.  
The Supreme Court has proclaimed that the statute is to be used in just and rational 
proportion to accomplish the goals of the Code; Section 105 is not a usurper of plain 
statutory text or a talisman that conjures substantive remedies out of thin air. 
 Just for Feet and its ilk find justification when none exists.  As set forth above, 
statutes like Sections 363 and 364 have their own jobs to do.  It does violence to 
their plain statutory text to twist them into vehicles to justify critical vendor relief, a 
task for which they were never intended. 
 Finally, too many of the decisions favoring critical vendor relief collapse 
under their own weight; they are built upon a foundation of sand.  Here, we speak to 
the distinct lack of factual investigation and principled decision-making therein.  
Lacking discipline, too many of these courts succumb to accepting the debtor’s mere 
say-so as a viable basis for granting critical vendor relief.  Lacking the necessary rigor 
of compelling a debtor and/or its so-called critical vendors to make a reasonable and 
90 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [VOL. 6 
substantial demonstration of a need for such extraordinary relief, principled decision-
making and firm factual underpinnings fall to the wayside.  Probably the words 
offender in this category was the bankruptcy court in Kmart. 
Kmart and the Death of Two Doctrines 
 It is not surprising that both the district court and the Seventh Circuit 
excoriated the lower court for its lack of solid factual findings.  It is no wonder that 
the higher benches were unabashedly critical of the debtor’s abject failure to bring 
more reliable facts to the forefront in seeking relief.  Here, the circuit court in 
particular strikes a resounding chord of warning.  Debtors must bring forth a 
compelling case for extraordinary relief based upon a great many provable facts that 
would justify overriding or extending the statutory text of the Code.  Bankruptcy 
judges should be sure to be skeptical of pleas for critical vendor relief, act only after 
vigorous fact-finding and should not use the chaos of the first day of a Chapter 11 
proceeding as a ground for hasty decisions.  One should not torture plain statutory 
provisions to justify results. The end does not justify the means in “critical vendor” 
motions. 
 In addition, the tribunal in Kmart was eminently correct in its point-by-point 
dismantling of the reliance upon other sections found within Chapter 3 of the Code.  
The operating provisions of Title 11 have well-defined purposes.  Let them stick to 
what Congress intends and do not bend them to suit the purposes of a “critical 
vendor” motion, a task for which they were never intended. 
 In many ways, it is most fitting that the Seventh Circuit has spoken on this 
divisive issue.  That appellate court has historically been one of the staunchest 
adherents to the plain meaning doctrine of statutory interpretation.  Moreover, the 
tribunal has sagely applied the plain meaning doctrine to the Bankruptcy Code with 
particularly just results.  Even a novice to bankruptcy jurisprudence would not be 
surprised that the Seventh Circuit clamped down hard on this misuse of Section 105 
in critical vendor situations.  Indeed, this is the last tribunal in America that could be 
expected to take a broad, unrestrained view of such a statutory grant of power.  The 
Seventh Circuit made clear that Section 105 is not a panacea for a debtor’s ills in a 
Chapter 11 case. 
 At the end of the day, what has the Seventh Circuit wrought in Kmart?  
Admittedly, it did not slam the door entirely on critical vendor relief.  Even for this 
writer, who is staunchly opposed to such ill-conceived tinkering with the Bankruptcy 
Code, it would be unwarranted to say that Kmart absolutely forbids such relief.  The 
point remains that the Seventh Circuit did not go so far because there was no need 
to do so.  The imprimateaur of the panel is manifold with profound effect.  First, it 
severely curtails an expansive, activist use of Section 105 as an answer for any and all 
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relief asked for but not contemplated by the written text of the Bankruptcy Code.  
“Anything goes” is not a synonym for Section 105 action. 
 Second, Kmart disabuses the misguided notion that other substantive 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code can come to the rescue.  Critical vendor relief 
cannot be justified based upon statutory authority to borrow money, sell assets in the 
ordinary course or even utilize assets outside the ordinary course of a debtor’s 
business.  The lesson imprinted by the panel is to not look for statutory relief in 
wholly unrelated provisions. 
 Third, if the reorganizing debtor was nonetheless still able to surmount these 
hurdles, then it and its favored vendors would still have to make a substantial 
showing of fact, law and circumstance to justify a grant of critical vendor relief.  By 
advocating such formidable prerequisites, the Seventh Circuit has imposed much 
needed and long absent rules to the process.  No longer can critical vendor relief be 
granted “on the fly” as part of the mad rush of “first day” orders.  This is now 
undeniably and irrevocably replaced with sound principles that make for better law.  
No doubt, Kmart has not outlawed critical vendor relief, but it brings order to the 
chaos.  In so doing, Kmart achieves a greater goal of limiting success in such 
adventures to only those debtors and vendors truly worthy of such relief. 
 Where do we go from here?  Absent from the reports is the filing of an 
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  Admittedly, the Seventh Circuit’s 
brethren in other circuits may dispute its ruling, but the Midwestern tribunal does 
not stand alone.  It has an ally to the south in the prescient decision of the Fifth 
Circuit in Oxford.  While other circuits might differ from their learned colleagues, the 
odds do not favor the emergence of a contrary viewpoint, at least not with the 
sagacity to overwhelm the Seventh Circuit’s wise opinion. 
 Rather, one can forecast Kmart as the new landmark that sweeps away the 
debris and hubris of decades of misconceived “Doctrines of Necessity” and its 
misbegotten offspring of critical vendor relief.  Certainly, “critical vendor” motions 
are a branch on the tree of the “Doctrine of Necessity.”  Generally, cutting off the 
branch does not kill the roots; but to cut back the branch so deeply often denies life 
to the trunk, destroying the roots.  It is firmly believed that lopping off this critical 
vendor branch will kill the roots of the “Doctrine of Necessity” once and for all.  If 
nothing else, with “critical vendor” motions reduced to an occasionally troublesome 
nettle, the once obstreperous tree of the “Doctrine of Necessity” will die down to a 
shrub. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Critical vendor relief is one of the newest and most important controversies 
roiling the bankruptcy courts today.  It has grave implications for the appropriate 
administration of Chapter 11 cases and even more important ramifications for the 
proper statutory construction of the Bankruptcy Code.  Yet it is a controversy that 
should not be. 
 Today’s “critical vendor” motions are based in part upon the very old 
Supreme Court elaborations of situational rules for railroad cases prevalent in the late 
Nineteenth Century.  They have no relevance under the modern Code or in present 
commercial circumstances.  Reliance upon those railroad cases is simply wrong, and 
thus, the notion is fatally flawed. 
 Moreover, critical vendor relief is the undesirable spawn of the misbegotten 
“Doctrine of Necessity,” which is another worn out rubric having no place in 
modern bankruptcy jurisprudence.  The time is long past to discard the “Doctrine of 
Necessity” as a wrongful, inappropriate usurpation of clear statutory authority.  As 
the “Doctrine of Necessity” dies, “critical vendor” motions must perish with it. 
 Now the Seventh Circuit has forcefully declared that critical vendor relief 
violates statutory priorities.  Admittedly, that appellate court left open a window for 
critical vendor relief, but it is a tiny aperture at best.  Far more important, the court 
meticulously hammered nail after nail into the coffins of both “critical vendor” 
motions and the “Doctrine of Necessity.”  These misguided notions are now so 
eviscerated by the Seventh Circuit’s wisdom that they are effectively defunct. 
 We can now proceed to the tasks at hand:  reorganizing debtors, distributing 
monies in equal measure to needy creditors and, finally free of these overreaching 
dogmas, following the clear statutory priorities as set out in unequivocal statutory 
language.  In sum, the death of these doctrines brings new and better life to the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
